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Security of E-Government Website Encryption 
in Germany and Hungary
Tamás SZÁDECZKY1
The paper deals with comparative research of the communication security 
of e-Government services in Germany and Hungary. The focus point of the research 
is to analyse the cryptographic security algorithms and protocols which encrypt 
communication in the relations of the citizen and a governmental body. The analysis 
includes the general e-Government portals, central web services, and specialised 
services, like taxation and criminal record extracts.
The actuality of the topic lies in the fact that the security of the citizens’ personal 
data, used, stored and transferred by the governmental bodies can be in danger. 
Two examples are the loss of 25 million UK citizens’ personal data in 2007 because 
of a failure of the UK Customs Service and the compromise personally identifiable 
information of 191 million US citizens, stored in the Voter Database in 2015.
The goal of the research is to check the current practice used for governmental 
communication, based on international standards and current practices.
The study compares the e-administration systems of a country of Central Europe 
which is considered less developed in e-government systems and processes than 
a Western European country. Based on the evaluation, which can be found at the end 
of this study, those persons who are responsible for the operation of such systems, 
can see the actual benchmarks of the communication security. So, this way they 
can learn about the usage of what communication protocols and cryptographic 
algorithms are recommended and under what settings.
Keywords: Hypertext Transfer Protocol Security, information security, transport 
layer security, web-based governmental services
Introduction and Parameters
A channel for the communication between the government and citizen is the data transfer 
between the e-government website and the citizen’s web browser. There is always some 
personal data exchange, even if the registered client is only viewing the website. The way 
for securing this communication depends on the responsible government body. Their 
requirement is applied by the technical operator of the webpage. Even if some rules are set 
by policies, the practice shall always be evaluated e.g. during an audit, because otherwise, 
the government body cannot be sure about the level of security. [1] The mode of this 
evaluation is the technical check of the detailed cryptographic protocols used, including 
the used algorithms, parameters and key sizes.
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The Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) communication is a secure way 
of viewing the web pages, which creates an encrypted connection between the web-server 
and the client-side browser. However, the protocols, which can be selected, algorithms and 
parameters are so diversified, that there is a big possibility of faulty or less secure settings. 
The user hardly ever has control over the security of the communication, and in most 
of the browsers the technical details are hidden, typically a blue or green bar or padlock is 
visible. In case of an analysis, we must use specialized tools, and we should check some 
parameters and settings in detail.
The first step of the security of the HTTPS is the security of the private key of the public key 
infrastructure (PKI), namely, it identifies the server itself. Here it can be expected the usage 
of RSA keys, the size of which are at least of the 2048-bit module and the usage of the SHA–
256 hash algorithm or better. All this was met in all six analysed web services. The issuer 
of the certificate must be reliable. Consequently, it must be issued by a recognized certificate 
authority (CA) or certificate service provider (CSP); however, the issue is more complex than 
this, and a formal investigation of it faces problems. [2] It would be advantageous if instead 
of the standard Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificates, Extended Validation (EV) certificates 
would be used for e-government websites, as seen in the case of ELSTER Online. In the case 
of EV SSL certificates, the control of the identity of the applicant legal person is also carried 
out, not only the fact is checked, whether the given server is under the influence of the applicant 
or not. The EV SSL certificate is indicated by the green bar or the name of the certificate 
holder. The key and the certificate were appropriate in case of every investigated system. 
The visibility of unencrypted, standard and Extended Validation SSL certificates for the users 
depends on the browser. In the case of HTTP vs. HTTPS, the difference is hard to see for an 
inexperienced user. As recent studies have shown, the individual user’s awareness is low in 
Hungary. [3: 65] The EV SSL certificate gives more assurance even for the inexperienced 
user, therefore increases trust in e-government services. Regardless, a higher level of security 
culture would also be inevitable from the aspect of cybersecurity. [4: 338]
The next step is the version of the protocol, which carries out the encryption, which can 
be SSL 2.0, 3.0, Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.0, 1.1, 1.2. The first two protocols are 
vulnerable; it is highly unadvisable to use them. The usage of the TLS 1.0 should already 
be avoided, but unfortunately, in many cases, it must be used because of compatibility 
reasons. In the case of the TLS 1.1, the bad configurations need to be avoided. However, 
the TLS 1.2 is appropriate and secure in every setup. It can be mentioned, as a basic problem 
that only the outdated TLS 1.0 protocol was used in two Hungarian systems and the TLS 1.0 
is still accessible in addition to the newer protocol in one-one German and Hungarian case.
From the key exchange procedures, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHE) and Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (ECDHE) should be supported, namely only these 
modern procedures make possible the support of the Perfect Forward Secrecy. [5: 581] 
The Forward Secrecy ensures that it is not possible to decode all earlier communication with 
the possibly hacked encryption key.
The size of the symmetric keys should be at least 128 bits in the case of Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, the weaker, 56 and 112-bit key algorithms cannot be 
considered secure ones anymore. The Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) algorithm is vulnerable, it is 
forbidden to use them, and the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (3DES) is out-of-date and 
slow. Consequently, it should be avoided.
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From the block cipher modes of operation, the usage of the GCM (Galois CounterMode) 
is advantageous, and it can be recommended over CBC (Cypher Block Chaining). [6: 549] 
The diffusion of the used algorithm is also an interesting question but, at the moment, it is 
not in our scope. [7]
With the usage of the HTTP Strict Transport Security setting, the non-encrypted 
communication with the server is not allowed, which is the most important parameter to be 
set. [8]
A Comparative Analysis: Germany and Hungary
Taking the above-written facts into consideration, the individual, selected general and 
local administration systems of the Federal Republic of Germany and Hungary have been 
compared in this paper; they have similar administrative functions. In all cases, the subjects 
of investigation were the systems, which carry out handling and transforming personal data 
and enabling customer relationship, at least in one of the countries. During the investigation, 
the communication protocol compliance assessment of the given system has been carried 
out. The sampled objects of the investigation are indicated in Table 1.
Table 1. The analyzed systems. [Edited by the author.]
Function Hungary Germany
General central or local 
e-government
general e-governmental client 
gate “Ügyfélkapu” in Hun-
garian
local administration portal, 
“Bürgerserviceportal” in 
German
Taxation services not applicable: sent with a spe-
cial application via the general 
e-governmental client gate




service website “Webes 
ügysegéd” on “Nyilvántartó.
hu” in Hungarian
criminal register excerpts on 
the website of the Federal 
Office of Justice, “Bundesamt 
für Justiz, Online-Beantragung 
von Führungszeugnissen” in 
German 
Separate authentication 
service Central Authentication Agent, 
“Központi Azonosítási Ügy-
nök” in Hungarian 
not applicable: authentica-
tion service is embedded in 
the services above, in most 
of the cases based on the new 
German personal identity card
As the reader can realize, the 1-to-1 mapping of those services is not possible, due 
to differences in the approach. At present, our research includes only the highest level 
of public services; however, as Soukopová, Nemec, Matějová and Struk shows, there are 
different aspects also to be considered in local level services. [9]
One sample is a general service, where more e-government services are available. Another 
example is the web service for the application of the criminal record excerpts. These were 
similarly available in both countries. Odd examples are the taxation services and a separate 
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central authentication service, which were available as a separate web-based service in one 
of the countries.
Methodology
During testing, we were carrying out two experiments. On the one hand, there were 
analysed the detailed characteristic features and parameters of the HTTPS communication 
of all the six systems in the system of the Qualys SSL Labs. [16] Qualys is one of the market 
leading manufacturers of vulnerability-analyzer systems. The Qualys SSL Labs service 
carries out detailed technical analysis regarding the algorithmic parameters and the HTTPS 
protocol of the web page, which provides the encrypted connection. The most important 
results of the several pages long, detailed analysis are summarized in Table 2. In case 
of every described website, the SSL Labs shows an overall result which is indicated in 
a separate figure. (Figures 1–6.) The overall rating provides a classification based on the most 
important security characteristic features which range from F (the worst) to A+ (the best). 
Here the goal is to achieve the best possible result, but the good result itself does not mean an 
assurance for meeting certain requirements yet. For example, the PCI DSS forbids the usage 
of the TLS 1.0, but the SSL Labs does not impair the assessment of the website when the TLS 
1.2 is also accessible in addition to the TLS 1.0. During the testing, a control investigation 
was carried out to prove the most important findings of the Qualys SSL Labs. In the control 
tests, we were using a Firefox 51.0.3 browser, which ran under a Windows 7 SP 1 (Build 
7601). In those tests, the encryption package, which was used during communication, had 
to be the same as the highest-level security of HTTPS communication setting recognized 
by the SSL Labs, which was primarily preferred on the server side. In addition to all this, 
we carried out a control-inspection regarding the issuer of the certificate, the modulus-size 
of the private key, and the other characteristic features of the certificate (the reliability 
of the issuer, the hash algorithm and the type of the validation).
General E-Governmental Client Gate (https://gate.gov.hu)
This website is the centralized identification system of the e-public administration. 
The clear majority of the e-government services, which are accessible in Hungary, carry 
out authentication through this system. One-factor exclusively, the knowledge-based 
identification is used here. The maximum period of validity of the password is two years.
The SSL certificate of the server has been issued by the Microsec e-Szigno SSL CA 2014, 
which is a qualified certificate authority in Hungary. The encryption package, which was used 
during the control inspection is TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 128-bit key, TLS 
1.0. The detailed results of the tests are in Table 2, and the summary is in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. SSL report of gate.gov.hu. [17]
The Specialized E-Government Services of Hungary (www.nyilvantarto.hu)
The web-based administrative assistant (in Hungarian: Webes ügysegéd) hosted on www.
nyilvantarto.hu is suitable for administration of criminal records, vehicle management 
and extracts from the register of births and marriages. Its identification is different from 
the identification system of the client gate. It uses the best TLS 1.2 for communication, but 
the earlier versions are also accessible. The identification happens by providing the username 
and the password combination, which are used in the client gate.
The SSL certificate of the server has been issued by the Microsec e-Szigno SSL CA 2014, 
which is a qualified certificate authority in Hungary. The encryption package, which was used 
during the control inspection is TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 256-bit key, TLS 
1.2. The detailed results of the tests are in Table 2, and the summary is in Figure 2.
Figure 2. SSL report of www.nyilvantarto.hu. [18]
The Central Authentication Agent of Hungary (https://kau.gov.hu)
The Central Authentication Agent is an integrated identification interface of the regulated 
public management services, which is a legally defined service in Hungary. The identification 
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can be carried out by the client gate username-password combination and by the identification 
certificate which is stored in the new type Personal Identification Card. Unfortunately, 
for the time being, this latter function does not work. Despite the fact that it is the integrated 
identification platform of the future, it, unfortunately, uses the same outdated protocols and 
settings for securing data traffic, as the client gate does.
The SSL certificate of the server has been issued by the NetLock Expressz (Class 
C) Certificate Service Provider, which is a qualified certificate authority in Hungary. 
The encryption package, which was used during the control inspection is TLS_RSA_WITH_
AES_128_CBC_SHA, 128-bit key, TLS 1.0. The detailed results of the tests are in Table 2, 
and the summary is in Figure 3.
Figure 3. SSL report of kau.gov.hu. [18]
The Local Administration Portal of Germany (www.buergerserviceportal.de)
There is no such integrated, general e-public administrative portal in Germany which would 
totally comply with the Hungarian client gate described above. What we inspect here is 
the web page which assures access to the separate provincial administrative functions. Such 
type of services of the federal states can be accessed through this portal, but the system 
separates all these from each other. The communication operates with TLS 1.2 protocol 
and with appropriate, modern encryption algorithms. The applied certificate assures 
the highest accessible security. The only possible way to carry out the identification is using 
the authentication certificate, which can be found in the new type Personal Identification 
Card, (“der neue Personalausweis”, nPA in German) and in the electronic residence permit, 
(“elektronisches Aufenthaltstitel”, eAT in German). So that the citizen can use a two-factor 
identification. The certificate, which is stored in the chip on the ID card, can be accessed 
with the PIN of the holder. The use of ID cards causes a problem because services are not 
accessible in such an extensive way, as it would in case of the client gate, due to the fact 
that it is necessary for the citizens to have new types of Identification Cards activated with 
the new functions, and they also must own appropriate card readers. This identification 
method practically excludes from the service those foreigners, who live in Germany.
The SSL certificate of the server has been issued by the T-Systems International GmbH, 
which is a qualified certificate authority in Germany. The encryption package, which was used 
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during the control inspection is TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 
128-bit key, TLS 1.2. The detailed results of the tests are in Table 2, and the summary is in 
Figure 4.
Figure 4. SSL report of www.buergerserviceportal.de. [19]
The Tax Administration Portal of Germany (www.elsteronline.de)
An integrated system of tax administration procedures is used at federal level in Germany. 
The personal income tax returns and other tax requests can be submitted through this 
portal called ELSTER Online. The encryption is even at a higher level than it is in case 
of the previous service, namely, here is used a 256-bit AES key. As it can also be seen in 
the tests, the setting of the web page is free from more significant configuration problems. 
The identification is carried out by default with the personal ID cards and the electronic 
residence permit, as it has been described earlier, but a soft certificate or a username-
password pair are also usable.
The SSL certificate of the server has been issued by the Symantec Class 3 EV SSL CA–G3, 
which is a qualified certificate authority in Germany. The encryption package, which was used 
during the control inspection is TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 256-
bit key, TLS 1.2. The detailed results of the tests are in Table 2, and the summary is in Figure 5.
Figure 6. SSL report of www.elsteronline.de [20]
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The Criminal Register in Germany (www.fuehrungszeugnis.bund.de)
The request concerning issuing a criminal record is carried out electronically at federal 
level in an integrated system on the web page of the Federal Office of Justice. This web page 
uses the protocol and algorithm, which has already been described at the tax administration 
web page, here the security settings of the web page are also appropriate. The identification 
here is also carried out with using the nPA and eAT.
The SSL certificate of the server has been issued by the “Zentrum fuer Informations-
verarbeitung und Informationstechnik ZIVIT CA–G01”, which is a federal state operated 
certificate authority in Germany. The encryption package, which was used during the control 
inspection is TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, 256-bit key, TLS 1.2. 
The detailed results of the tests are in Table 2 and the summary is in Figure 6.
Figure 6. SSL report of fuehrungzeugnis.bund.de. [21]
Evaluation, Conclusions
The major problem we found during our analysis, is the fact that the user has lack of control 
and low level of awareness. Human-related errors are typical attack vectors. Therefore, 
these are also a focus topic in regulation. [10] However, the browsers are not supporting 
enough the users. The visibility of unencrypted, standard and Extended Validation SSL 
certificates for the users are shown in Figures 1 to 6. The EV SSL certificate gives more 
assurance even for the inexperienced user, therefore increases trust in e-government 
services. Although the IT security is a focus topic after the public administration reform in 
Hungary, the security awareness level will increase slowly, so public servants are also not 
likely to realize a problem from the service provision side. [11]
Figure 7. Browser search bar when opening a site without encryption in Firefox. [22]
Figure 8. Browser search bar when opening a site with standard SSL certificate in Firefox. [23]
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Figure 9. Browser search bar when opening a site  
with an Extended Validation SSL certificate in Firefox. [24]
Figure 10. Browser search bar when opening a site  
without encryption in Internet Explorer. [25]
Figure 11. Browser search bar when opening a site with  
standard SSL certificate in Internet Explorer. [26]
Figure 12. Browser search bar when opening a site with  
an Extended Validation SSL certificate in Internet Explorer. [27]
It is hard for the user to see if the connection is HTTP or HTTPS. The difference is only 
a padlock logo somewhere. The details of the connection protocol are not visible for the user 
in Chrome. In the Internet Explorer, only the certificate details are visible. Firefox shows 
the most details. Therefore, this was used for the control measurement.
The overall rating of SSL Labs provides a classification based on the most important 
security characteristic features, which extends from F (the worst) to A+ (the best).
The comparison of the results of the tests is in Table 2. The analysis does not include 
vulnerability analysis, because it needs previous authorization to avoid legal impacts. 
With the usage of OWASP TOP 10 threat analysis, the risks from attacks, e.g. cross-site 
request forgery (CSRF), cross-site scripting (XSS) or SQL injection might be significantly 
lowered. [12]
Table 2. Results of the analysis. [Edited by the author.]
Country Hungary Germany
Properties/Section 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7
Certificate RSA 















Trustworthy CA yes yes yes yes yes yes
Extended validation no no no no yes no
TLS version 1.0 1.0; 1.1; 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2
1.0; 1.1; 
1.2
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Country Hungary Germany











256 128, 256 128, 256 128, 256





RC4 support no yes no no no no
3DES support yes yes yes no no yes
Forward Secrecy no partly no yes yes partly
HTTP Strict Trans-
port Security no no no yes yes no
Overall Rating 
(A+ is the best, F is 
the worst)
The application of inappropriate protocols, algorithms, and parameters makes possible 
the attack against web pages or the communication channel; for example, the vulnerability 
of the TLS, which can be exploited, came to light in the last few years. Regarding the fact 
that the application of the out-of-date encryption poses a direct danger, concerning the data 
of the citizens, it is inevitable to change these into up-to-date solutions. All the investigated 
German e-government services almost totally comply with the security requirements of our 
era. The application of them do not pose any danger, at least from a technological point 
of view regarding the data of the citizens; still, here, too it is recommended to disable 
the TLS 1.0 and 1.1. The application of the ownership and knowledge-based multi-factor 
identification is to be especially highlighted instead of the exclusively knowledge-based 
identification. All this provides extremely high security, but unfortunately, it significantly 
limits the wide access to the e-government functions. A solution can be found to all this 
by the introduction of the digital identity card, which has been applied in Estonia; it is 
also accessible for foreigners and ensures full access to all e-public services. [13: 24] 
In contrast to Hungary, where there is no governmental requirement, guidance or best 
practice, in Germany it exists. Similarly to ETSI communication security guidelines, 
the Federal IT Security Agency of Germany (BSI) has specified the requirements. Both 
the minimum standards for SSL/TLS [14] and the BSI TR–03116–4 [15] requires the usage 
of TLS 1.2 with Perfect Forward Secrecy from 2015. However, the tested services did not 
fully comply (see Table 2). However, it is always recommended to use in the e-government 
services the standards and recommendations, which meet the international best practice, 
for example, the usage of the NIST and ETSI standards.
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